CX PARTS CATALOG

PRINTERS AND CONTROLLERS
TPW JetScript-CX,
History

HISTORY OF JETSCRIPT...

...and how The Printer Works built the JetScript-CX

The large quantity of surplus JetScript controllers that allowed The Printer Works to offer "PostScript for Peanuts" was a side-effect of a big industry starting to roll. During the formative years of desktop publishing, circa 1984 to 1987, PostScript was not the entrenched industry standard it is in 1995. Ownership of whatever language would become the standard was a gold mine sought by many companies. Each of the large documentation and office automation companies was trying to establish its own printer language as the standard.

Xerox, feeling more or less ripped off when two of its top researchers left PARC to start Adobe Systems, had decided never to license PostScript. Xerox tried unsuccessfully to promote PostScript's predecessor, which was called InterPress, but seemed not to have an executable plan to get Interpress out of the lab and to the masses. This same problem was the reason so many great technologies were taken from Xerox by the people who invented them.

HP wanted to sell printers in order to sell computers and didn't see PCL becoming a licensable standard, but didn't complain when other laser printer manufactures decided to clone PCL. At the start, HP viewed Apple and Adobe as its main competitors for printer sales, and so it opposed adopting PostScript. HP finally came to understand the value of PostScript, realizing that the structure of PCL would never fully support what the publishing industry demanded in the way of functionality and device independence. HP decided to endorse a fourth Page Description Language (PDL), called DDL (Document Description Language), from a medium-sized company in Santa Clara, California (Imagen). Kodak was one of Imagen's largest OEM customers and had developed workstation software that supported DDL. When HP made the decision to go with DDL, Steve Jobs stated publicly at the 1986 Seybold Desktop Publishing Exposition that HP was "brain dead" for not selecting PostScript.

QMS had its own graphics language (QUIC), which had a following in the Unix world, but QMS saw the light and jumped at the chance to license PostScript.

Genicom decided that something like PCL with scalable fonts was the way to go and it came out with a language called ACE, which totally flopped. OASIS offered its own language, with the pyramid font system. AST's initial TurboLaser used an obscure language called Laser Language, from the controller developer called Laser Graphics Corporation (perhaps its existence was the reason QMS chose the unusual spelling for its printer: Lasergrafix). LaserMaster announced SST (SuperScript Turbo), and many others also came up with printer languages.

Ultimately, the technical superiority of Adobe PostScript combined with the marketing prowess of Apple and Linotype (a team that delivered a one-two knock-out combination punch) to establish PostScript as the preferred language for desktop publishing. People used the LaserWriter for inexpensive and painless proofing, then obtained final output on high-quality film from the Adobe-based Linotronic imagesetter. (For non-publishing applications, HP's PCL became the standard, for the reasons explained in the HP section of this catalog.)

JetScript's role in this grand standard-setting revolution was to bring the two biggest standard setters (HP and Adobe) together, by way of QMS in Mobile, Alabama. Ironically, both HP and Adobe had been founded in Palo Alto, California, and they are both still headquartered there; but it wasn't until after QMS filed a lawsuit against HP over the JetScript contract that HP and Adobe became friends and business partners.

Evidently, some QMS sales people had heard that HP was losing some big government printer sales, due to the fact that the HP II lacked PostScript capability. In most cases, PostScript capability was just a "checklist item" at the time. Most users didn't really know what it was yet, but the buyers had heard it was good and wanted to be able to add it in the form of an upgrade if they needed it later.

QMS had come out with a PostScript conversion for the HP LaserJet, called PS-Jet, and was planning a PostScript upgrade for the HP LaserJet Series II, possibly in the form of the embedded PS-810 controller, and possibly in the form of a slot card. QMS had not finished JetScript when discussions began with HP. QMS had already contracted with Adobe for PostScript for the SX engine (the PS-810). QMS sold HP on the idea that QMS could provide PostScript compatibility to HP faster than HP could get it directly from Adobe, because QMS was high in the queue and knew how to validate the finished product.

HP and Imagen had decided the best way to add DDL was with an IBM PC-based slot card. In this way, users could make use of the printer-embedded PCL 4 controller or the external Imagen DDL card for what they each did well. HP engineers had already developed the "tail card" for insertion into the HP II's optional video interface slot for use with the Imagen card. This intelligent card contained an 8051 microprocessor and took control of the LaserJet Series II controller to put messages on the control panel and arbitrate data being received at the various input ports. Early Jetscript controllers were shipped with tail cards designed, and possibly manufactured, by HP.

QMS announced a joint marketing arrangement in a press release that was approved by HP, stating that QMS expected an increase in sales of about 50 million dollars, based on the JetScript controllers that HP and QMS would sell. Both HP and QMS were to sell JetScript controllers to HP's installed base. HP provided its LaserJet Series II customer list to QMS's subsidiary, The Laser Connection, to help with the marketing and sales campaign. Apparently, HP became quite annoyed when The Laser Connection proceeded to send literature about other QMS products to the HP customer list. As a result, HP did not promote JetScript. HP sales people called the JetScript a "font card," didn't promote the other benefits of PostScript, and sales floundered. HP stopped ordering JetScript as sales dropped off. QMS, on the other hand, was very concerned that the big sales increases it had promised the Wall Street analysts would not materialize. QMS decided to sue HP on the grounds HP was not purchasing at the rate agreed upon and announced. QMS claimed damages caused by ramping up production of JetScript cards that HP wasn't buying. It seems HP did not pay attention to the fact that the QMS contract stipulated that any disputes would be heard on QMS's turf: Mobile, Alabama.

QMS people were golden in Mobile. QMS was responsible for bringing a lot of money into town, and one of the key people involved in negotiating the HP deal had just left QMS to become the mayor. So, naturally, any decision reached in Mobile was likely to be strongly in QMS's favor.

A secret settlement was reached, in which HP was required to purchase millions of dollars worth of JetScript cards that HP did not want or need. This is how a huge surplus of JetScript cards was created at HP.

To recover its lost dollars, HP half-heartedly continued to sell JetScript. In the meantime, Pacific Data Products announced the first PostScript cartridge for the HP II. Adobe realized this was a great opportunity and offered to create a similar product for HP, but HP had so many JetScript cards to sell that it declined. Adobe decided to go ahead and sell its own cartridge for the Series II and promoted it heavily. Pacific Data Products had the momentum and was selling tens of thousands of its cloned Postscript cartridges, based on PhoenixPage, every month. Adobe couldn't stand to see a cloner build such a large installed base that was not true Adobe PostScript, and felt compelled to compete in this large market to maintain its leadership role. HP had already sold two million LaserJet Series II printers by this time, and the market was too important for Adobe to let Pacific Data Products have it all to itself.

The JetScript card was much faster than these PostScript cartridges, but its retail price of $2,495 (and street price of about $1,800) made it too expensive for most buyers. At that time, PostScript cartridges were sold for about $695 and, even if a 2.0 megabyte RAM card were added to that for another $300, the JetScript solution was still twice the cost. All things being relatively equal, users almost never pay more for increased speed alone. The advent of the low-cost, conveniently installed PostScript cartridges made it virtually impossible to sell JetScript at a profit any more, so QMS also ended up with a large amount of unsold JetScript cards to liquidate.

HP started discounting the JetScript to its regular dealers to increase sales. Then it decided to let a broker sell the cards to anyone who wanted them for about $795. The Printer Works learned from the broker that about 10,000 cards might be available. The broker was unable to sell them at the prices HP had set for him, so they could be available for even less.

The Printer Works realized if the JetScript could be adapted to the CX engine, and if HP were willing to lower the price further, a PostScript printer could be built using Federal Express Zap Mail printers, for a fraction of the normal cost. This was a tremendous opportunity for a small company like The Printer Works. Several other companies had also seen the opportunity, but none of them were able to get the JetScript to work with the CX engine. The Printer Works had been a very active retailer for QMS and had a few connections there that the other companies didn't have. We called QMS to find out whether the JetScript would work with the CX. Someone there was sure it would, because one engineer had been using a JetScript that way for several years. QMS sent us via Federal Express envelope a copy of the code that the lone engineer had been using, and it worked! We were elated. We knew that if we could somehow raise the money to buy the JetScripts and the CX engines we would have a real winner.

Meanwhile, HP decided to blow out the JetScript cards by selling directly to its installed base at only $495. Orders were handled by the HP Direct division, which usually sold cables, fonts, toner and other miscellaneous supplies. Sales accelerated, but some 5,000 units still remained in HP's warehouses.

The biggest challenge The Printer Works faced was how to lock up this inventory, since rival companies were after the opportunity as well. Without the cash to simply purchase all the printers and JetScript cards, we decided to get a head start on the competition by starting to sell. The Printer Works created its PostScript for Peanuts campaign and began to take orders and ship product for $1,495, based on a JetScript cost of $750 and an engine cost of about $250.

Soon after The Printer Works' first PostScript for Peanuts ads hit the street, an order for a JetScript-CX came in from a secretary at a law firm, who just ordered one without asking any questions. Most customers were very skeptical; they wanted to come in for demo if they could, and to get printer samples and literature before purchasing. As it turned out, this particular printer surfaced at LaserSmith, the company who had failed to sell most of the 8,000 Federal Express engines with expensive controllers.

When LaserSmith learned it was possible for the JetScript to drive the CX, it tried to buy the JetScript cards directly from HP. HP would have sold them happily if LaserSmith could have paid for them. LaserSmith tried to convince its backers in Canada to purchase the JetScript cards, but the backers had had enough of LaserSmith's business plans and were reluctant to go any deeper into what had become a bad deal for them. As a way to avoid spending more cash, LaserSmith proposed that the Canadians trade half of the 6,000 CX engines they had to HP for 3,000 JetScript cards. This would have given LaserSmith 3,000 complete printers to sell and the money to pay back the Canadians with a profit. The Canadians decided they didn't trust LaserSmith's sales abilities, and that if CX engines had any value to HP, they would much rather have the cash than a bunch of JetScript cards for LaserSmith to sell. The Canadians decided to sell 3,000 printers to HP for less than cost to minimize their exposure. To make up for the loss to HP, they agreed to sell the rest at a profit to The Printer Works under a contract purchase agreement that required us to buy about $200,000 worth up front.

In the meantime, a company named Buffalo was building a video photo booth for arcades using the CX engine as the output device. Buffalo wanted to buy all of the Federal Express CX engines for its product. The Canadians had investigated Buffalo and decided not to do business. When Buffalo learned we had made a deal for half the CX engines and HP had made a deal for the other half, Buffalo tried to force us to sell CX engines by telling HP it would buy all of the JetScript cards, knowing we had not yet purchased them.

Buffalo asked LaserSmith to introduce us and we ended up having a breakfast meeting. At this memorable meeting, Buffalo produced a cobbled-together brochure that offered our JetScript-CX product under a different name, and claimed it was planning to go into the business of selling JetScript cards and CX printers like we were. Buffalo was no doubt toying with the idea as a way to generate some cash, but its main goal was actually to get CX engines for the video photo booth. Buffalo told us it had purchased all the JetScript cards and if we wanted any we would have to sell them CX engines. Fortunately for The Printer Works, we had made a deal with QMS for its JetScript cards that Buffalo didn't know about. We were able to tell Buffalo that although we would very much like to have the JetScript cards Buffalo had bought from HP, we could still sell our CX engines with controllers we had purchased from other sources. Buffalo was shocked. (As it turned out, Buffalo purchased about 500 of HP's JetScript cards and sold them in various ways, for chips or for use with HP II printers. We ended up trading Buffalo some engines for JetScript cards, because we actually did need them as well.) Ultimately, Buffalo did succeed in tying up the HP inventory for about two months, during which time The Printer Works was able to get Wolf Computer to put a deal together for The Printer Works to buy about 2,600 JetScript cards directly from HP. HP Leasing financed the more than half a million dollar purchase for us and Wolf received a healthy commission for arranging that deal.

After pulling off this amazing purchasing coup, The Printer Works was left with the formidable task of reworking the product, selling it, supporting it and fixing many little bugs. We set out to do it in one year, but after six months we were way behind schedule. We kept at it; adjusting the price, refining the advertisements and follow-on literature, and adding more and better sales people. At the magic number of $995, sales climbed and up to 600 units per month in September 1991, which is when we started selling the LX-29000. In the end, The Printer Works managed to sell about 7,000 JetScript-CX printers in a two-year period.